ON Securities : Securities Lawyer & Attorney for Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Matters

After all the speculation about effective dates of the new amendments to the proxy disclosure rules, the SEC on Tuesday published a set of Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations that clarifies the effective date of the new amendments. The C&DIs clarify that the effective dates are indeed in line with the statements made at the public hearing at which the amendments were adopted.

The most important clarification is that companies with a fiscal year ended before December 20, 2009 will not have to comply with the new rules this year. A company with a fiscal year ended on or after December 20, 2009 will be required to comply, unless the definitive proxy materials and the Form 10-K are filed before February 28, 2010. The C&DIs also clarify some of the transition rules in connection with IPOs and other special situations.

Of course, the section of the ON Securities Cheat Sheet discussing the amendments has been updated consistent with the C&DIs.

Next week, I will discuss some examples of risk-based compensation analysis. In the meantime, you might review this previous post that includes insights from a recent Deloitte program on compliance with the new rules.

Again, Happy Holidays! For those of you in the Upper Midwest, if you have to drive, drive carefully.

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More Risky Business - A Case Study in the Risk Aspects of Compensation

There was a fascinating article in the New York Times on Thursday about Merrill Lynch's 2006 bonus program, which resulted in large payouts to top management even as the company was sold to Bank of America in a distressed sale. The author of the article provides more in-depth analysis in a post in the Times' DealBook Blog. Of course, these pieces probably attracted my attention because the DealBook post starts with "Calling all compensation nerds".

The Times article lays out the ways in which the Merrill plan was supposed to align top management pay with long-term performance, but concludes that the plan "did not keep workers from taking risks that nearly sank the brokerage giant. And some of its senior executives still stand to collect millions of dollars in stock under the plan." The Blog post discusses the features of the plan that put a portion of the employees' bonuses at risk, provided for a partial clawback if return on equity was not adequate, and invested the bonus amounts in stock that was locked up for a year past the three-year term of the plan.

While the article itself focuses attention on the failings of the Merrill plan, the Blog post provides a more nuanced view of the effort put into structuring the program, and the reasons it may not have been fully effective:

The Bottom Line: Talk to people who were in the plan, and they will tell you it worked because Merrill executives lost money in the clawback in 2007 and also because of the sunken stock price. However, the executives all did better than regular investors who put in money at the same three points but did not have the firm's leverage to help. Of course, the executives work at the company, and the plan was meant to compensate them in part for that work.

Why did the plan fail to save Merrill? Some compensation experts suggested it should have been applied to far more people. Others said a single year's return on equity might not be the right metric. And others said risk management and capital rules also contributed to Merrill's problems.

I think the Merrill plan had many worthy features that should command the attention of compensation professionals, especially in the financial services industry where risk management will become the Holy Grail of compensation programs. The Blog analysis above points out that some adjustments in the Merrill program could have made it much more effective - for example, the plan should have applied to far more people. In the financial services industry, bonuses to employees at all levels fueled excessively risky practices. But just because the program didn't perfectly match investor losses with executive losses, that doesn't mean the Merrill program wasn't a worthy effort.

In-House Lawyer Bloggers - What's Next?

Here's a new one - The Corporate Counsel Blog reports that in-house corporate attorneys have joined the blogging world. For example, Doug Chia, Senior Counsel at Johnson & Johnson, is posting on J&J's corporate blog. Chia reports that he is encouraging other in-house attorneys to blog. One of his goals is to get relevant information to retail shareholders, in preparation for the next proxy season when brokers will not be able to vote without instructions from these shareholders.

What's next? I haven't seen any GC's tweeting - yet.

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Last week, the Twin Cities Chapter of the National Association of Stock Plan Professionals hosted a presentation on hot topics in executive compensation, led by Tara Tays and Rive Rutke of Deloitte Tax. I have included their PowerPoint under the Resources section of this blog, and in a future post I will discuss some of the compensation trends they reported.

One of the hot topics covered by the presenters was compensation risk analysis. They presented a very high-level summary of steps a company should consider - see pages 12 and 13 of the PowerPoint. Financial institutions receiving TARP funds are already required to do this analysis; for other types of companies, they may not yet have initiated a formal risk analysis process, monitored at the Compensation Committee level.

As I discussed previously, if the SEC adopts its proposed amendments to the proxy rules, each public company will be required to disclose in its proxy statement how its overall compensation policies for employees (including compensation of non-executives) create incentives that can affect the company's risk level, and its management of risk. The disclosure is required if the compensation policies create risks that may have a "material adverse effect" on the company.

Comment: The bottom line is that the proxy rule amendments requiring this risk disclosure may be effective in the upcoming proxy season. Public companies should start thinking about the analysis that must be completed by then, in order to be able to make a well-founded statement in the proxy statement. The recommended steps in Deloitte's flow charts will not apply to all companies, but at least they provide a benchmark for companies that have already started the process, or a starting point for those that have not.

What do you think of Deloitte's recommended approach? Do you have any tips to share? Send me an e-mail, or post a comment below. And be careful out there - it's a risky world.

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The news today was filled with reports on the first anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. That event represented the first time most of us realized the extent of the financial disaster that played out over the following few months. Not exactly cause for nostalgia.

At around the same time, our local chapter of the National Association of Stock Plan Professionals (NASPP) produced a webcast/conference call entitled "Troubled Company, Workout and Bankruptcy Issues: A little 'gloom and doom' with your morning java." I moderated the panel discussion, which featured very topical discussions by Mike Meyer, a bankruptcy attorney with the Ravich Meyer firm, and Scott Feraro and Kathy Bonneville, compensation consultants with Seabury OCI Advisors, LLC. Obviously, this topic is just as relevant today as it was then. Just to keep on sharing the "gloom and doom", we have made the transcript available - it makes interesting reading. Topics included:

The role of compensation and risk management in the financial meltdown, and ways to structure compensation in a troubled company situation

Executive hiring, employment arrangements and retention in workout and bankruptcy situations - including the types of retention arrangements that will "fly" in bankruptcy court

Strategies in dealing with underwater stock options

Let's hope for a better year ahead.

SEC Enforcement Follow-Up

The SEC just got another incentive to ratchet up its newly aggressive enforcement posture another notch. On Monday, as described in this New York Times article, Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff issued a scathing order (see the link in the Times article) that voided Bank of America's $33 million settlement with the SEC. The enforcement proceeding related to Bank of America's failure to disclose the approval of Merrill Lynch bonus payments in the merger proxy statement. The judge was especially hard on the SEC's failure to go after the individual officers of Bank of America, accusing the parties of using the shareholders' money to reach a settlement that absolves the individuals of responsibility. If a new settlement is not reached and the case goes to trial, the judge will have plenty more opportunity to chastise executives, lawyers and public officials alike. It will be interesting to see whether the negative publicity causes the SEC to take its enforcement activity to yet another new level.

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The SEC takes action on July 1, but that's not the whole story.

On July 1, 2009, the SEC voted to take several actions:

The Commission proposed rules that would clarify the statutory requirement that TARP recipients hold annual stockholder votes on compensation ("Say-on-Pay").

The Commission proposed revisions to the compensation disclosure rules that, among other things, would (1) disclose the relationship to risk of a company's overall compensation policies (not just policies covering top executives) and (2) disclose potential conflicts of interest of compensation consultants.

In probably the most important move, the Commission approved the New York Stock Exchange's proposal to eliminate discretionary voting in elections of directors. Therefore, brokers must receive instructions from the beneficial owner before voting. The conventional wisdom is that brokers acting without instructions generally vote in favor of management's slate, and that this change will reduce the percentage of shares voting for the director candidates in routine elections. The Wachtell Lipton law firm presented an interesting analysis of this issue in March, taking the position that the current broker votes in favor of management are a pretty good proxy for the votes of retail stockholders, who generally support management's candidates.

However, to understand the impact of the July 1 actions, it is necessary to understand other current developments, some of which would have an even greater impact on a broader segment of companies:

The Commission's Say-on-Pay proposals covered only TARP recipient companies. However, the Shareholder Bill of Rights Act introduced in the Senate by Senator Schumer, if adopted, would mandate Say-on-Pay for all public companies, as would two other bills currently being considered by Congress.

The Commission did not require that public companies adopt a specific structure to assess risk and ensure that compensation practices are consistent with the company's risk profile. However, the ARRA and the Treasury's interim final rules currently require the compensation committees of TARP recipients to perform specific risk management functions. Also, the Schumer bill would require that the board of directors of all public companies form a risk committee of independent directors to report to the board about the company's risk profile and the appropriateness of its compensation practices.

The elimination of discretionary voting by brokers takes on added importance because it could alter the balance of power between management and activist stockholders, especially for companies that have adopted majority vote standards in director elections. This shift would compound the potential increase in power by institutional investors that would result from the Commission's controversial proxy access proposal, reported here, which would allow large stockholders to nominate director candidates who would be included in management's proxy statements.

The bottom line: you need a scorecard to keep everything in context. The ON Securities Blog is working on a scorecard that will cover the SEC proposals, the Schumer bill, other pending bills and the Treasury regulations under TARP and the stimulus bill. What would you like to see covered? Send me an e-mail and let me know.

Maslon Small Public Company Forum's Inaugural Event is a success (singing fish and all).

On June 24, 2009, I participated in the inaugural event of the Maslon Small Public Company Forum, which included presenters from Maslon, Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, Carver Moquist & O'Connor, Feltl and Company and Internal Control & Anti-Fraud Experts, LLC. Course materials and podcasts of the presentations are available at the Small Public Company Forum website, which we hope will be a great resource for small public companies across the region.

For my presentation on underwater options entitled "Underwaterworld", I presented the "world's leading expert on underwater options": Big Mouth Billy Bass, the famous singing fish. You can watch Billy's full performance here. In his immortal words, once you solve your company's underwater options problem, you can take his advice: "Don't Worry, Be Happy!"

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