The Say When on Pay Vote: What Should a Board Recommend?

Should a public company board of directors be watching the “scoreboards” of previous “ballgames” when making a recommendation on this year’s frequency vote (“Say When on Pay”)? I’m referring to the tallies of the frequency votes of public companies that have already held their annual meetings this year. Keeping track of these votes, almost in real time, reminds me of watching ESPN’s BottomLine sports ticker. The conventional wisdom seems to be that boards of directors should base their recommended frequency on what they see on the sports ticker. I don’t agree, at least not in all cases.

It’s been widely reported that shareholders are generally casting a majority of votes in favor of an annual Say-on-Pay vote, even though the boards of directors in most cases have recommended a triennial vote. Many large shareholders have followed the advisory firm ISS’s blanket recommendation in favor of a vote for annual frequency, adding momentum to this trend. Last week, Mark Borges reported on these voting results in the Proxy Disclosure Blog on CompensationStandards.com (a subscription site). He reported that a majority of companies recommending a triennial vote have had the shareholders vote in favor of annual votes. His statistics show that this trend toward an annual vote is even stronger at large companies – virtually no larger public companies have yet succeeded in bucking this trend (except a handful that have a single large shareholder who would agree with the board). He predicts, probably accurately, that this trend will continue.

How should the board respond? Here is Borges’ analysis:

So, at this point, is there any reason to make a triennial vote recommendation? My instinct says no - why put the board of directors in the position of having to make a difficult decision if - and when - the vote goes against you? I guess that a triennial recommendation still makes sense in two situations: one, if you're confident that your shareholders are in agreement with the recommendation, or, two, if you want to put shareholders on notice that, absent a near unanimous vote by shareholders, you prefer and intend to proceed with a triennial vote. Otherwise, I'm not sure that, at this stage, we aren't seeing the handwriting on the wall.

And Broc Romanek, in a recent post on The Advisors’ Blog on CompensationStandards.com, agreed:

I agree wholeheartedly with Mark Borges' blog . . . . I'm not sure why companies continue to recommend triennial now that the early meeting results bear out that shareholders will often reject that frequency . . . . It's a reminder of what shareholder engagement is all about - listen to your shareholders and act on what they say. Clearly, many companies are choosing to operate in a bubble.

I have to respectfully disagree with Mark and Broc. The board should make recommendations based on its judgment about what is in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, after considering all relevant factors. For a company with stable management, sound pay practices and a long-term perspective on compensation, the board may legitimately believe that a triennial vote is the best option. And some large shareholders, notably the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, BlackRock Institutional Trust Company and Wellington Management Company, agree with this approach and will generally favor a triennial vote. Should the board ignore their viewpoints, especially if they are large shareholders?

Borges argues that, with a triennial recommendation, after the annual meeting it will be a “difficult decision” for the board to reverse course and recommend the annual vote favored by shareholders. Again, I disagree that this should be the deciding factor. The board can believe that a triennial vote is the best approach but later report that it has considered, and will follow, the preference expressed by the shareholders. I don’t see that as such a bad declaration by a board. However, it’s important that the board consider the right factors in advance, to avoid surprises:

  • Recognize that the triennial choice is an uphill battle in the best of circumstances.
  • If there have been, or will be, major changes in management or compensation practices, or other signs of instability, it is more difficult to conclude that a triennial vote is in the best interests of the shareholders. Recommend an annual vote.
  • Assuming that the actual vote is reasonably close, the board should carefully analyze the results in reaching its conclusion. Did the annual vote get a clear majority of the votes, or win by a narrow plurality? Did large shareholders who voted for an annual vote disclose the reasons for their vote to management? The final advisory vote rules under the Dodd-Frank Act give the company 150 days after the annual meeting to report a final decision on frequency. Take your time.
  • If the board doesn’t feel comfortable having the above discussion, then by all means the board should recommend an annual vote. But recognize that it’s not the only possible course of action.

I’ve talked to a number of in-house attorneys at companies of various sizes about this, and none of them believed that the above discussion was too difficult, or that it would cause great embarrassment to accept the will of the shareholders, or that somehow such a reversal by the board would embolden large shareholders more than they are already emboldened. Certainly, not every board will want to “go there” – everyone recognizes that the equation will be different for every board and every company. That’s one of the things that has made this issue so interesting.

Keep watching the sports ticker. Let’s just hope not every company will decide to forfeit based on the score of someone else’s game.
 

Preparing for the Shareholder Advisory Votes, and the Concept of Engagement

I thought Valentine’s Day would be a great time to talk about engagement.

In this case, I’m talking about “engagement” by public companies with their shareholders. A lot of commentators these days are talking about engagement in the context of the new shareholder advisory votes regarding executive compensation (Say-on-Pay and the frequency vote) required under the Dodd-Frank Act.

In his Byrd Watch report released last week, “The Permanent Engagement Campaign for Say on Pay/Say on When Votes,” Francis Byrd of Laurel Hill Advisory Group gave a nice summary of engagement issues to be considered by public companies. After he discusses concrete steps companies should consider he describes his concept of a “permanent engagement campaign” – i.e., one that doesn’t end on the date of the annual meeting:

Once upon a time, shareholders voted in accordance with management and the logistics of the proxy vote was the greatest difficult companies faced in electing directors and approving corporate actions. Those days are gone forever. There are no routine annual meetings. Whether your SOP vote is approved by a wide or narrow margin (or defeated) you will need to maintain your engagement teams and continue on-going dialogue with your investors.

Another interesting document is the set of Global Corporate Governance & Engagement Principles published by BlackRock, a major asset manager and institutional investor. The document lists BlackRock’s general global policies for evaluating governance of its portfolio companies. I thought the interesting part was the last section, where BlackRock talks about its own internal oversight of its decisionmaking progress as it relates to voting shares. In other words, this describes how a large shareholder responds to engagement by its portfolio companies.

The New, Slimmed-Down Version of the Say-on-Pay Rules

The SEC just released the Federal Register version of its final rules on Say-on-Pay, the frequency vote and Say on Parachutes. This version, thankfully, is only 39 pages (including the cover page), compared to the 152-page beast that was available previously. Always a relief – the same useful information, but much lighter in my briefcase. On Valentine’s Day, I can once again truly say I love the SEC . . . .
 

More Thoughts on Keeping Score: Shareholder Advisory Votes on Compensation

It’s early February, and everyone has their eyes on the score in the biggest game of the year. I don’t mean the Super Bowl (especially after the season the Minnesota Vikings had, which we’d all like to forget). I mean this year’s annual shareholders meeting for every public company. This year, the annual meeting is a whole new ball game, because for the first time, most public companies are facing two new shareholder advisory votes required under the Dodd-Frank Act: the frequency vote (“Say When on Pay”) and the Say-on-Pay vote itself.

This year so far, I’ve spent a lot of time focusing on the frequency vote, because it involves several tactical decisions for boards of directors, and new language to be drafted. Now the voting results are starting to come in. It’s becoming clear that the choice for an annual Say-on-Pay frequency has “The Big Mo” on its side, fueled by the recommendation of the shareholder advisory service ISS to support an annual frequency, and the stated preferences of a large number of institutional shareholders for an annual vote. According to the Proxy Disclosure Blog (subscription site) by Mark Borges of Compensia on CompensationStandards.com earlier this week:

If you're keeping score, of the nine companies that recommended a triennial vote and have so far announced their voting results, five have seen their shareholders express a preference for annual votes. This week should help determine whether this early trend is going to hold.

I’ve advised companies to keep their eye on the ball, though. That means focusing more attention on the Say-on-Pay vote itself. Ultimately, the results of this vote will have more impact than the frequency vote. Borges reported the following earlier in the week:

There were 18 annual meetings of shareholders held this past week where shareholder advisory votes were conducted . . . . Of the 10 companies reporting the voting results from their annual meetings, nine reported that their executive compensation programs had been approved via "Say on Pay" votes, with passage rates ranging from 65.8% (Monsanto) to 99.4% (Tech/Ops Sevcon - a smaller reporting company). One company - Jacobs Engineering Group - disclosed that its "Say on Pay" vote had failed, with only 45.5% voting in favor of its executive compensation program.

Of course, I’ll continue to watch, and comment on, the scores at upcoming annual shareholders meetings. And I guess I’ll watch the Super Bowl too – it has much better commercials.